This paper analyzes the risk attitude and investment behavior of a group of heterogeneous consumers who face an uninsurable background risk. It is shown that standard risk aversion at the individual level does not imply standard risk aversion at the group level under e¢ cient risk sharing. This points to a potential divergence between individual and collective portfolio choices in the presence of background risk. We show that if the members' absolute risk tolerance is increasing and satis…es a strong form of concavity, then the group has standard risk aversion.
Introduction
Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that people are more reluctant to invest in risky assets when they face other sources of uninsurable and undesirable "background" risk (e.g., labor income risk). 1 In a seminal paper, Kimball (1993) shows that an expected-utility maximizer with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and decreasing absolute prudence (DAP) will have this type of response to background risk. The combination of DARA and DAP is referred to as standard risk aversion. In the present study, we ask whether a group of diverse individuals, who share risks e¢ ciently among themselves and make joint investment decisions, will respond to background risk in the same way. Speci…cally, we want to identify the conditions under which the group's preferences (or aggregate utility function) exhibit standard risk aversion.
It is known that if all members have DARA preferences, then the aggregate utility function will have the same property. 2 However, this is not true in general for DAP, as we will show below.
In other words, standard risk aversion at the individual level is not enough to ensure standard risk aversion at the group level under an e¢ cient risk-sharing arrangement. One implication is that a group of standard-risk-averse individuals under such arrangement may choose to increase their exposure to risky assets in the presence of background risk. A speci…c example is shown in Section 3. In this paper, we ask the question: under what conditions will collective portfolio choices under background risk be consistent with individual choices? Our main result shows that if each individual member's absolute risk tolerance is increasing and satis…es a strong form of concavity (which implies DAP) then the aggregate utility function is standard. This result has two other implications on the group's preferences. Firstly, since standard risk aversion implies proper risk aversion and risk vulnerability, our result ensures that the group's preferences will have these properties. 3 Secondly, DAP implies that the aggregate utility function has a negative fourth derivative. 4 Apps et al. (2014) show that this property is not guaranteed in general even if all the members'utility function have negative fourth derivative. Consider a static model with a group made up of N individuals, N being an integer greater than one. The group has a sure amount of initial wealth W > 0; which can be invested in two assets: a safe asset with a riskless rate of return r > 0 and a risky asset with a random rate of return e R: Let and W denote, respectively, the amount of risky and safe investment. The gross return from this portfolio is given by
where ! W (1 + r) > 0 and e x e R r is the excess return from the risky asset. The random variable e x is drawn from a compact interval X R according to some probability distribution.
Apart from the risky investment, the group also faces an exogenous, uninsurable background risk e y in …nal wealth. The background risk is drawn from a compact interval Y R; it can take both positive and negative values and is statistically independent of e x: 5 The probability distributions of e x and e y are known to all group members, so there is no disagreement in their probabilistic beliefs. The sum of investment returns and background risk is used to …nance the members'consumption. The group as a whole thus faces the following budget constraint:
where e c i denotes member i's consumption. Each member's preferences can be represented by E [u i (e c i )] ; for i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g : The utility function u i : R + ! R is at least …ve times di¤eren-tiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satis…es the Inada condition lim c!0
We focus on e¢ cient decisions made by the group. Speci…cally, the members of the group collectively decide on a level of risky investment ( ) and an allocation of consumption (e c 1 ; e c 2 ; :::; e c N ) 5 One example of such background risk is household earnigs risk. In particular, a positive value of e y can be interpreted as a positive deviation in household earnings from its expected value. This can be the result of a promotion or bonus. On the other hand, a negative value (or negative deviation from the mean) can be the result of a layo¤. The independence assumption is commonly used in the background risk literature [e.g., Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) , Kimball (1993) and Gollier and Pratt (1996) so as to maximize a weighted sum of their expected utility, i.e.,
where i > 0 is the Pareto weight for member i; subject to (1) and e c i 0 for all i: This problem can be divided into two parts: First, conditional on and the realization of (e x; e y) ; the group solves a resources allocation problem:
subject to
e c i z ! + e x + e y; and e c i 0 for all i:
For any z > 0; the constraint set of the above problem is compact. This, together with a continuous and strictly concave objective function, ensures the existence of a unique solution.
The Inada condition ensures that each optimal e c i is strictly positive. By the maximum theorem, The second part of the group problem is to choose the level of risky investment, i.e.,
Since the optimal choice of all e c i must be strictly positive, the group must choose so that z ! + e x + e y is strictly positive for all possible realizations of (e x; e y) : Depending on the boundary values of X and Y; this can allow for short-selling of the risky asset (i.e., < 0) or short-selling of the safe asset (i.e., > W ). Since the objective function in (3) is continuous and strictly concave in , a unique solution (denoted by ) exists. 
Di¤erentiating both sides of (5) with respect to z gives We now consider the e¤ect of background risk on the group's investment decision. Note that the portfolio choice problem in (3) is no di¤erent from the one faced by a single decision-maker (normative representative agent) with utility function b u ( ) : Thus, according to the variant of Proposition 6 in Kimball (1993, p.610), any independent background risk e y that raises the representative agent's expected marginal utility under the optimal choice ; i.e.,
will lower the absolute value of if and only if b u ( ) exhibits standard risk aversion, i.e., when both b A ( ) and b P ( ) are decreasing functions.
From (4) and (5), it is obvious that if T i ( ) is an increasing function (or equivalently, A i ( )
is a decreasing function) for all i; then b A ( ) must be decreasing. The relation between P i ( ) and b P ( ) is examined in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1
The representative agent's absolute prudence is given by
with …rst derivative
Proof of Lemma 1 Di¤erentiating
Substituting these questions into (6), and using
Equation (8) follows immediately by rearranging terms and applying (4). Next, di¤erentiating (8) with respect to z gives
Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to z gives
Equation (9) can be obtained by combining the last two equations.
Equation (9) shows that the …rst derivative of b P ( ) can be decomposed into two parts:
The …rst part captures the e¤ects of P 0 i ( ) on b P 0 ( ) : In particular, this term is negative if all group members have decreasing absolute prudence. The second term captures the effects due to the heterogeneity in absolute cautiousness across group members. Since b
is the weighted average of fT 0
is the variance of absolute cautiousness among the group members, which is always positive. Thus, even if all members have DAP preferences, the representative agent may not. In this case, it is possible to …nd fe x; e yg such that the group will increase with > 0 and > 0: Both individuals exhibit (weakly) decreasing absolute risk aversion and (weakly) decreasing absolute prudence. When acting alone, the …rst agent's choice of is unaffected by any background risk that satis…es (7), while the second agent will reduce his/her risky investment. Suppose now the two form an e¢ cient risk-sharing group and suppose 1 = 1:5; 2 = 1:0; = 0:1 and = 0:4: The resulting b P (z) ; as depicted in Figure 1 , is non-monotonic and strictly increasing when z is small. Take ! = 4:5 and suppose e x has only two possible states, -0.2 and 0.24, with equal probability. In the absence of any background risk, the couple's optimal choice of risky investment is 1 = 5:093: Suppose now we introduce a background risk e y, which can take three possible values: -2.0, 0 and 2.6, with equal probability. 6 In the presence of e y, the couple will increase their risky investment to 2 = 5:105:
The results in our Lemma 1 are closely related to those in Hara et al. it is also 2 -concave for all 2 1 : If both g ( ) and e g ( ) are twice di¤erentiable, then g ( ) is
-concave if and only if
The main result of this paper is to show that if each group member's absolute risk tolerance is -concave, for some 2; then the representative agent's absolute risk tolerance is a concave function. This result holds regardless of whether T i ( ) is monotonic. It follows that if each 
7 This result has appeared in Gollier (2001b, p.166) . Its proof follows immediately by noting that b
for all z > 0: 8 Quasi-concavity and logconcavity of g ( ) correspond, respectively, to the cases of = 1 and = 0: 9 If Ti ( ) is increasing and -concave for some 2; then it is increasing and concave in the usual sense. Thus, by Lemma 2, ui ( ) has standard risk aversion.
Using (4) and (6), we can rewrite this as
Thus, it su¢ ce to show that T 00 i (c) This completes the proof.
In the economics literature, the assumption of -concavity is typically imposed on the density function of some distributions. 10 To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst study that 
